The usual political head-hunters were out doing what they do best at Wednesday's Senate subcommittee hearing on the Crandall Canyon mine collapse - finding fault and who's to blame in classic ex post facto fashion. This time, however, there was a troubling amount of substance in what they discovered.

The hearing left more questions about the Crandall Canyon mine collapse than it answered.

Why were the dangerous Crandall Canyon mining plans originally approved? Why were the three rescue workers allowed to re-enter the mine when experts deemed it unsafe? Why weren't the mine's many violations previously penalized by the government? Most puzzling, why didn't the administration know about the "bump" - the explosion of a coal wall - that likely contributed to the Aug. 6 collapse, in March when the mine co-owner says it was reported?

After a round of chastisement by members of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, the head of Mine Safety and Health Administration, Richard Stickler, failed to either condemn or support the Crandall Canyon mining plan previously approved by his administration. He claimed that he needed more time to investigate the accident before issuing a statement on whether his administration was right in approving the plans.

The Daily Universe supports the complete gathering of facts before making an assessment. The problem, however, is that whether the government made a mistake in approving the plans has little to do with the accident investigation. MSHA did not have the benefit of the accident report when it approved the plans, nor should the investigation's results have any bearing on the correctness of their decision. Likewise, they will not have such accident reports when approving future mining plans.

The fact that Stickler awaits the report makes us wonder whether MSHA conducted a thorough investigation of the safety of the mining plans when they were originally submitted.

The time for investigating the safety of the Crandall Canyon mining operation has long passed. The administration should be confident enough in its processes, criteria and personnel to either support or condemn the approval based on its own internal information.

This aside, MSHA should have had an opportunity to evaluate the safety of the Huntington mine situation immediately following the March bump. The mine co-owner claims that he reported the incident to MSHA, but the administration says it did not know of the bump until after the Aug. 6 collapse. Such miscommunication is particularly bothersome in hindsight. Had the administration taken the proper actions following the March bump, the August tragedy may have been prevented.

What is even more troubling is that the Huntington mine collapse is only the latest in a string of MSHA failures. Last year was the deadliest year for coal mining in more than a decade. Each accident reveals that many mines are not complying with government codes and raises the question, "Why isn't the government doing more to enforce its own regulations?"

Obviously, it is easier to look back on the matter and point out which mistakes were made and who made them, but MSHA has a dismal history in this regard. The Crandall Canyon mine had violated a series of regulations, but the penalties were yet to be enforced. If the government is to prevent mining tragedies such as the one that took place in Crandall Canyon, it must take more of a strong-arm tactic in punishing violations and enforcing its own regulations.

This editorial represents the opinion of The Daily Universe editorial board. Opinions expressed here are not necessarily those of BYU, its administration or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

Copyright Brigham Young University 7 Sep 2007